The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario has dismissed significant portions of two discrimination applications filed by a tenured philosophy professor at Queen’s University, finding that some allegations were filed too late, others lacked proper standing, and certain claims were already addressed through grievance arbitration.
The tribunal struck all allegations occurring before Nov. 15, 2009, from the first application filed in 2010, along with multiple allegations the professor brought on behalf of third parties without proper consent. The tribunal also dismissed paragraphs relating to the professor’s office removal that had been adjudicated in a 2019 arbitration award.
The professor filed her first application in November 2010, alleging ongoing gender and disability discrimination following the appointment of a new department head in 2001. She claimed a pattern of male favouritism emerged, with her and other female faculty members experiencing adverse treatment when she raised concerns about gender bias starting in 2008.
A second application was filed in November 2014, alleging continued reprisal and discrimination through 2013 and beyond. The professor grieved some allegations through her union, the Queen’s University Faculty Association, including the university’s decision to remove her from her long-held office.
Limitation period issues
The tribunal found the professor was clearly aware of her rights to file a tribunal application, having pursued internal complaints through the university’s harassment and discrimination procedures in 2008 and 2009. In a letter dated September 2009, she acknowledged the internal complaint process had closed and warned she would file a tribunal application within two weeks if her concerns were not addressed. She waited over a year to do so.
“The decision to not file within 12 months of the last incidents that led to the respondent’s initial interventions by the respondent following her October 2008 complaints was her choice,” the tribunal determined.
The tribunal found the incidents between 2001 and 2008 were too disparate in time and factual basis to constitute a series of incidents that would make the application timely. The professor had catalogued dozens of incidents dating back to 2004, including being removed from organizing roles she had previously held, which were given to male colleagues instead.
“It is not sufficient to string a theme together so broadly,” the tribunal stated, citing previous case law that requires more than broad themes of discrimination to establish a series of incidents.
The tribunal rejected the professor’s argument that all incidents from 2001 onwards formed an ongoing pattern of discrimination. It found she had ample opportunity to file her application after raising internal complaints and attending various meetings and a departmental retreat in 2009 to discuss the issues.
No good faith explanation for delay
The professor did not provide a good faith explanation for waiting to file after completing the internal complaint process. The tribunal noted she invoked a high volume of documents but cited no other reason for the delay regarding the first application.
“The applicant was aware of the issues at hand and she had ample opportunity to file an application,” the tribunal found.
However, the tribunal found the second application filed in 2014 was timely, as it involved a series of incidents with the last falling within the limitation period. Even if there had been a delay, the professor demonstrated good faith by providing medical evidence showing she had become ill due to workplace stress and had commenced medical leave shortly after being told to vacate her office.
Third-party standing rejected
The tribunal dismissed allegations the professor brought on behalf of approximately 10 third parties, including students and other female faculty members. The professor claimed she filed consent forms in July 2012 for six third parties, but the tribunal had no record of receiving signed forms.
The tribunal ordered the professor to provide signed consents within three weeks following a May 2025 preliminary hearing, but no signed forms were received. Materials showed the professor’s counsel had withdrawn the request to include claimants in December 2012, stating she would call these individuals as witnesses instead.
The professor argued verbal consent or freshly signed forms at this late stage would be sufficient and more expeditious than calling additional witnesses. She also claimed she had public interest standing given her leadership role at the university.
The tribunal rejected these arguments. “It would not be fair, just, nor expeditious to proceed on this basis,” the tribunal stated, noting the respondent required information about claimants early in the process to properly form its response.
The tribunal struck incidents relating to observations of other female faculty members’ experiences, including concerns being dismissed, differential decisions favouring male faculty, minimization of female achievements, harassment of female graduate students, and scapegoating of female students.
Grievance arbitration bars some claims
The tribunal dismissed allegations from the second application relating to the professor’s removal from her office in November 2013, finding they were appropriately dealt with in a 2019 grievance arbitration award.
The union had grieved the office removal as a contravention of the collective agreement, seeking compensation for injury to health, reputation, dignity and disruption to academic duties. The arbitrator awarded remedies including compensation for injury to dignity.
“This is precisely the type of situation that s. 45.1 of the Code aims to prevent,” the tribunal stated, referring to the provision that allows dismissal when another proceeding has appropriately dealt with an application’s substance.
The tribunal found the arbitration constituted a proceeding where both parties had full opportunity to call evidence and make submissions to an adjudicator with authority to decide the matter. The arbitrator considered injury to dignity and psychological harm while reviewing whether the office removal decision fell within management’s rights under the collective agreement.
The tribunal struck paragraphs relating to the office banishment and prohibition orders but will allow the professor to introduce these facts for context only. She may not seek remedies for breaches related to these incidents.
Remaining claims proceed
Despite the dismissals, significant allegations from both applications will proceed to a hearing on the merits. The tribunal found timely all allegations from November 15, 2009, onwards in the first application, including incidents where the university reviewed the professor’s behaviour and issued warnings and disciplinary measures in 2010.
The second application’s allegations of ongoing discrimination, reprisal and toxic work environment will also be heard, with the exception of the struck paragraphs relating to the office removal.
The applications have been consolidated and remain before the tribunal for further proceedings.
For more information, see (Plaintiff) v. Queen’s University, 2026 HRTO 37 (CanLII).
