An arbitrator has ruled that S.G.S. Canada must keep its Vancouver International Airport fuel terminal staffed at all times with at least four employees — one crew leader and three terminal operators — rejecting the employer’s view that the collective agreement only governed how shifts were scheduled.
The decision allowed a grievance brought by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 502, which challenged the employer’s practice of leaving absences unfilled at its discretion.
S.G.S. Canada operates a marine terminal, fuel receiving terminal and underground pipeline serving the Vancouver International Airport in Richmond, B.C. The facility runs continuously with two 12-hour shifts a day, and employees work a rotation of four days on and four days off. Schedule A of the collective agreement divides the workforce into four crews.
At the centre of the dispute was a clause titled “Minimum Crew Manning,” which states that each of the four crews “shall consist of one (1) Crew Leader and three (3) Terminal Operators.” The employer argued the clause governed only scheduling — that once it placed four employees, including a crew leader, on each crew, its obligation was met. Absences could be filled with overtime from another shift or left open, at the employer’s choice. The union argued the clause required the terminal to be staffed by at least four employees, including a crew leader, whenever it was operating.
Bargaining history did not settle the meaning
The arbitrator found that extrinsic evidence from the bargaining table did not reveal a shared intention. Each side, the arbitrator concluded, held a different subjective understanding of the clause.
The union’s labour relations officer drafted the language, drawing on the union’s collective agreement with Westshore Terminals, and intended that the employer maintain a minimum on-duty staff of four at all times. The employer, meanwhile, had separately sought and received approval from its client to add four employees to its schedule, hoping that scheduling four per shift would mean at least three reported for work. When the employer saw the union’s proposal, it viewed the language as a “happy accident” that matched what it already planned to do.
Much of the employer’s case rested on a remark made by its representative at the table — “we’ll schedule four and hope to get three” — directed at the union’s plant chair. The arbitrator accepted that the comment was likely made, but found it was delivered as a side remark and a “dig” intended to provoke a reaction over absenteeism, not as an explanation of the clause. The comment, the arbitrator found, was consistent with the employer’s interpretation but not inconsistent with the union’s, and so did not put the union on notice of any difference.
Plain meaning of ‘manning’ favoured the union
With the bargaining evidence set aside, the arbitrator turned to the words of the agreement. The requirement that each crew include a crew leader — an employee trained as an OFA 2 first aid attendant, paid at a higher rate and responsible for taking the lead in emergencies — suggested the parties expected a crew leader to be present when work was performed, not merely listed on a schedule.
The arbitrator also found the clause’s heading was substantive rather than descriptive, because the concept of a “minimum” appeared nowhere else in the provision. That made the meaning of “manning” central. In its plain and ordinary sense, the arbitrator found, “manning” refers to the operation of a facility or piece of equipment. The parties themselves had used “minimum manning” at the table to describe the separate berthing and sailing clause, which clearly governs staffing for active work.
The arbitrator rejected the employer’s argument that different wording in the berthing clause — which says employees “will be used” — signalled a different meaning in the staffing clause, which says crews “shall consist” of four employees. The difference, the arbitrator found, reflected only different sentence structures, not different intent. The arbitrator also declined to read the berthing clause’s reference to “normal available crew” as proof that “crew” elsewhere included absent employees.
Clear language argument rejected
The employer argued that any restriction on its right to schedule staff, and any provision creating overtime costs, had to be expressed in clear and unequivocal language. The arbitrator found this overstated the principle, noting that nearly every collective agreement provision restricts management rights.
While accepting that the clause could have been drafted more clearly, the arbitrator found the union’s interpretation neither improbable nor surprising, given that minimum manning clauses are common in the longshoring industry and that the union had just secured one in the berthing clause.
The arbitrator also dismissed the employer’s alternative argument that the union was estopped by its silence after the “dig” comment, finding the union was under no duty to speak because the remark did not signal a conflicting interpretation.
The grievance was allowed. The arbitrator retained jurisdiction to address remedy if the parties cannot agree.
Counsel for Plaintiff Craig Bavis and Daniel Mare, for the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 502.
Counsel for Defendant Ilan Burkes and Sasha Lallouz, for S.G.S. Canada Inc.
Decision Maker Brett Matthews, Arbitrator.
For more information, see S.G.S. Canada Inc. v International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 502, 2026 CanLII 44917 (CA LA).
